An Arabic-language media outlet wrote in an analysis that amidst the rapid changes in the global balance of power and the widening gap between East and West, Iran has consolidated its position more than ever in the Eastern bloc—a position built on strategic cooperation with Russia and China. This approach, a direct consequence of US and European pressure and the return of sanctions against Tehran, has now become a core component of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.
Tehran - ISNA - The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar wrote: "As global power dynamics accelerate, the region has become a new stage for redrawing the East-West alignment, and Iran has found a growing role at the center of these developments. Russia and China have drawn closer to Tehran in recent years than ever before—a trend that intensified following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the return of sanctions, effectively compelling Iran to adopt a 'Look East' policy.
This approach led to the formation of long-term strategic cooperation agreements with Moscow and Beijing, ultimately culminating in Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS group, an expansion supported directly by the two Eastern powers. Despite this proximity, questions remain in Tehran regarding the level of commitment and genuine support from China and Russia, especially after the 12-day aggression by Israel and the US against Iran. Some expected a stronger, less cautious reaction from the two countries, but the response from Moscow and Beijing was measured, calm, and based on a balance between "interest and support," rather than outright alliance or direct conflict.
Cautionary Support and Geopolitical Logic
While Iran attempts to restore its deterrence, it expects Russia and China to play an effective role in confronting Western pressures. In this regard, sources in Tehran report the arrival of shipments from China, including solid rocket fuel and advanced industrial equipment, as well as various shipments from Russia. However, long-discussed items such as the Su-35 fighter jets and the S-400 air defense system have not been seen in these shipments.
Nevertheless, the support is cautious, as neither country has given Iran a formal security guarantee, and no trilateral defense mechanism has been defined within the SCO or BRICS frameworks.
In essence, all forms of support fall within the "national interests" of the two aforementioned countries. As long as Iran's stability and the Eurasian energy and transit routes are maintained, support continues. However, if Tehran moves toward direct confrontation with Washington, this support will quickly diminish.
A deep difference in geopolitical logic determines Russia and China's behavior. For Moscow, the 12-day aggression signaled a decline in US hegemony and the beginning of a multipolar order. China, however, views the issue primarily through the lens of economy and energy. According to the Gulf Chinese Studies Center, the Israeli attack on Iran created a 32% security gap in regional energy and raised oil prices to $104. From China's perspective, maintaining Iran's stability is a structural necessity for the continuation of the "Belt and Road" initiative and the security of energy routes to western China.
De-Dollarization and Cautious Partnership
The activation of the "snapback mechanism" by the E3 (three European countries) and the return of UN sanctions in September posed a new test for Iran's relations with the East. Russia and China quickly labeled the move a "blatant violation" of Resolution 2231 and actively worked to mitigate the impact of the sanctions.
Russia facilitated non-dollar transactions between Tehran and Beijing via the SPFS financial system (Russia's version of SWIFT). According to the Central Bank of Iran, approximately 22% of financial exchanges with Russia (equivalent to $3.2 billion up to October) were conducted through this channel.
China expanded its oil trade with Iran via the CIPS system and intermediary companies in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. According to Refinitiv data, the volume of non-dollar exchanges between the two countries in the first quarter of this year exceeded $17 billion, with only 18% transacted in dollars—a clear sign of genuine "de-dollarization" in their financial relations.
On a deeper level, Russia and China view Iran as a victim of the West-centric global structure that is gradually eroding, rather than a factor of instability. From Beijing's perspective, Western sanctions represent a new form of "containment policy against the national capabilities of independent states."
From this viewpoint, Moscow and Beijing's policy toward Tehran today is built on a model of "cautious support." They consider Iran a strategic pillar of balance in West Asia, but their long-term interests remain paramount in their engagement with Tehran. They are neither full allies nor neutral observers; rather, they are "prudent partners" who seek to keep Iran strong without entering into direct confrontation with the West.
Now, after a tense period, Iran has managed to solidify its position in the Eastern bloc, not through full dependence, but through the intelligent management of shared interests. Simultaneously, the behavior of Russia and China exemplifies a new model of "non-allied partnership"—a partnership based on interest and stability, not military commitments."